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Abstract
We investigate the problem of strategic point-to-point communication with side information at the
decoder, in which the encoder and the decoder have mismatched distortion functions. The decoding
process is not supervised, it returns the output sequence that minimizes the decoder’s distortion function.
The encoding process is designed beforehand and takes into account the decoder’s distortion mismatch.
When the communication channel is perfect and no side information is available at the decoder, this
problem is referred to as the Bayesian persuasion game of Kamenica-Gentzkow in the Economics
literature. We formulate the strategic communication scenario as a joint source-channel coding problem
with side information at the decoder. The informational content of the source influences the design
of the encoding since it impacts differently the two distinct distortion functions. The side information
complexifies the analysis since the encoder is uncertain about the decoder’s belief on the source statistics.
We characterize the single-letter optimal solution by controlling the posterior beliefs induced by the
Wyner-Ziv’s source encoding scheme. This confirms the benefit of sending encoded data bits even if the
decoding process is not supervised.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
What information should be communicated to a receiver who minimizes a mismatched distortion
metric? This new question arises in the context of the internet of things (IoT) composed of a
variety of devices which are able to interact and coordinate with each other in order to create new
applications/services and reach their own goals. In this context, wireless devices may have distinct
objectives. For example, adjacent access points in crowded downtown areas, seeking to transmit at the
same time, compete for the use of bandwidth; cognitive radio devices mitigate the interference effects
by allocating their power budget over several parallel multiple access channels, as in [1, Sec. IV]. Such
situations require new efficient techniques to coordinate communication traffic between devices whose
objectives are neither aligned, nor antagonistic. This question differs from the classical paradigm in
Information Theory which assumes that communicating devices are of two types: transmitters who pursue
the common goal of transferring information; or opponents who try to mitigate the communication, e.g. the
jammer corrupts the information, the eavesdropper infers it, the warden detects the covert transmission. In
this work, we characterize the information-theoretic limits of strategic communication between interacting
autonomous devices having general distortion functions, not necessarily aligned.
A. Scenario and contributions
We formulate the strategic communication problem as a joint source-channel coding problem with
decoder’s side information, in which the encoder and the decoder are endowed with distinct distortion
functions de and dd. Both distortion functions depend on the symbols of source, side information and
decoder’s outputs. We consider that the decoder is not supervised and strategic, i.e. it selects a decoding
strategy τ which is optimal for its own distortion function. The encoder anticipates the mismatch of the
decoder’s distortion’s and implements an encoding strategy σ that minimizes its distortion. The problem
we consider lies on the bridge between Information Theory and Game Theory, and is given by
lim
n→+∞
inf
σ
max
τ∈argminτ˜ d
n
d
(σ,τ˜ )
dne (σ, τ). (1)
The main difficulty comes from the fact that the decoder can possibly choose an output sequence
that induces a catastrophic distortion for the encoder. This modifies the encoder’s objective, which is
to control the decoder’s posterior beliefs regarding source symbols, rather than transferring information.
The closest paper in the literature is [4], in which no side information is available at the decoder.
In this article, we demonstrate that an optimal strategy of the decoder produces a sequence of outputs
which is almost the same as the one prescribed by the Wyner-Ziv’s coding in [5], adapted to the joint
source-channel scenario by Merhav-Shamai in [6]. This demonstrates that the Wyner-Ziv’s source coding
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3reveals nothing but the exact amount of information needed by the decoder. We establish a single-letter
expression for the decoder’s posterior belief, that allows us to characterize the solution of problem (1).
Our solution boils down to the previous results in [5] and [6], when both distortion functions are equal.
Then, we reformulate the solution in terms of a convex closure of an auxiliary distortion function
with an entropy constraint. This simplifies the optimization over the set of probability distributions by
reducing the dimension of the single-letter problem. This second solution also relates our result to the
literature on Bayesian persuasion games, see [7]. As an illustration, we consider the example of the
doubly symmetric binary source introduced by Wyner-Ziv in [5, Sec. II], for which we compute the
optimal solution explicitly. We notice that the optimal cardinality of the auxiliary random variable is
either two or three, depending on the source and channel parameters.
We point out three essential features of strategic communication problem with decoder’s side
information.
1. Each source symbol has a different impact on the encoder and the decoder’s distortion functions,
hence it is optimal to encode each symbol differently.
2. The noiseless version of this problem without decoder’s side information corresponds to the Bayesian
persuasion game of Kamenica-Gentzkow [7]. In that case, the optimal information disclosure policy
requires a fixed amount of information bits. When the channel capacity is larger than this amount,
it is optimal not to use all the channel resource.
3. The decoder’s side information has two opposite effects on the optimal encoder’s distortion: it
enlarges the set of decoder’s posterior beliefs, so it may decrease the encoder’s distortion; it reveals
partial information to the decoder, so it forces some decoder’s best-reply symbols which might be
sub-optimal for the encoder’s distortion.
B. Related literature
The problem of “strategic communication” in information-theoretic setting has been formulated by
Akyol et al. in [8], [9], [10]. The authors characterize the optimal solution for Gaussian source, side
information and channel, with the Crawford-Sobel’s quadratic cost functions [11]. They prove that the
optimal solution in the one-shot problem is also optimal when considering several strategic communication
problems. This is not the case for general discrete source, channel and mismatched distortion functions.
These results were further extended in [12] for non-identical prior beliefs about the source and the
channel. The problem of strategic communication was introduced in the Control Theory literature by
Sarıtas¸ et al. in [13] and [14]. The authors extend the model of Crawford-Sobel to multidimentional
sources and noisy channels and they determine whether the optimal policies are linear or based on
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4some quantization. The connection to the binary hypothesis-testing problem was pointed out in [15].
Sender-receiver games are also investigated in [16], for the problem of “strategic estimation” involving
self-interested sensors; and in [17], [18], for the “network congestion” problem. In [19], [20], [21], the
authors investigate the computational aspects of the Bayesian persuasion game, when the signals are noisy.
In [22], [23], the interference channel coding problem is formulated as a game in which the users, i.e. the
pairs of encoder/decoder, are allowed to use any encoding/decoding strategy. The authors compute the
set of Nash equilibria for linear deterministic and Gaussian channels. The non-aligned devices’ objectives
are captured by distinct distortion functions. Coding for several distortion measures is investigated for
“multiple descriptions coding” in [24], for the lossy version of “Steinberg’s common reconstruction”
problem in [25], for the problem of minimax distortion redundancy in [26], for “lossy broadcasting” in
[27], for an alternative measure of “secrecy” in [28], [29], [30], [31].
The lossy source coding problem with mismatched distortion functions was formulated by Lapidoth, in
[32]. In this model, the decoder attempts to reconstruct a source sequence that was encoded with respect
to another distortion metric. The problem of the mismatch channel capacity was studied in [33], [34],
[35], [36], [37], in which the decoding metric is not necessarily matched with the channel statistics.
Zn
Un Xn Y n V n
P Te d
de(u, v) dd(u, v)
Fig. 1. The information source U and side information Z are drawn i.i.d. according to PUZ and the channel TY |X is memoryless.
The encoder e and the decoder d minimize mismatched distortion functions de(u, v) 6= dd(u, v).
The problem of “strategic information transmission” has been well studied in the Economics literature
since the seminal paper by Crawford-Sobel [11]. In this model, a better-informed sender transmits a
signal to a receiver, who takes an action which impacts both sender and receiver’s utility functions. The
problem consists in determining the optimal information disclosure policy given that the receiver’ best-
reply action affects the sender’s utility, see [38] for a survey. In [7], Kamenica-Gentzkow introduced the
Bayesian persuasion game in which the sender commits to an information disclosure policy before the
game starts. This subtle change of rules of the game induces a very different equilibrium solution related
to Stackelberg equilibrium [39], instead of Nash equilibrium [40]. This problem was later referred to
as “information design” in [41], [42], [43] and extended to the setting with “heterogeneous beliefs” in
[44] and [45]. In most of the articles in the Economics literature, the transmission between the sender
September 18, 2020 DRAFT
5and the receiver is noise-free; except in [46], [47], [48] where the noisy transmission is investigated in a
finite block-length with no-error regime. Interestingly, Shannon’s mutual information is widely accepted
as a cost of information for the problem of “rational inattention” in [49] and for the problem of “costly
persuasion” in [50], without explicit reference to a coding problem.
Entropy and mutual information appear endogenously in repeated games with finite automata and
bounded recall [51], [52], [53], with private observation [54], or with imperfect monitoring [55], [56],
[57]. In [58], the authors investigate a sender-receiver game with common interests by formulating a
coding problem. They characterize the optimal solution via the mutual information. This result was later
refined by Cuff in [59] and referred to as the “coordination problem” in [60], [61], [62], [63].
The paper is organized as follows. The strategic communication problem is formulated in Sec.
II. The encoding and decoding strategies and the distortion functions are defined in Sec. II-A. The
strategic communication scenario is introduced in Sec. II-B. Our coding result and the four different
characterizations are stated in Sec. III. The first one is a linear program under an information constraint,
formulated in Sec. III-A. The main Theorem is stated in Sec.III-B, and the sketch of proof is in Sec.
III-C. In Sec. III-D, we reformulate the solution in terms of three different convex closures. Sec. IV
provides an example based on a binary source, binary side information and binary decoder’s actions. The
proofs are stated in App A - D.
II. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION PROBLEM
A. Coding strategies and distortion functions
We denote by U , Z , X , Y , V the finite sets of information source, decoder’s side information, channel
inputs, channel outputs and decoder’s outputs. Uppercase letters Un = (U1, . . . , Un) ∈ Un and Zn, Xn,
Y n, V n stand for sequences of random variables, whereas lowercase letters un = (u1, . . . , un) ∈ Un and
zn, xn, yn, vn stand for sequences of realizations. We denote by ∆(X ) the set of probability distributions
over X , i.e. the probability simplex. For a probability distribution QX ∈ ∆(X ), we write Q(x) instead of
QX(x) for the probability value assigned to realization x ∈ X . The notation QX(·|y) ∈ ∆(X ) denotes
the conditional probability distribution of X ∈ X given the realization y ∈ Y and Q⊗nX ∈ ∆(X
n)
denotes the i.i.d. probability distribution. The distance between two probability distributions QX and PX
is based on L1 norm, denoted by ||QX −PX ||1 =
∑
x∈X |Q(x)−P(x)|. We denote by D(QX ||PX) the
K-L (Kullback-Leibler) divergence. The notation U −
−X −
− Y stands for the Markov chain property
corresponding to PY |XU = PY |X . We consider an i.i.d. information source and a memoryless channel
distributed according to PUZ ∈ ∆(U × Z) and TY |X : X → ∆(Y), as depicted in Fig. 1.
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6Definition II.1 (Encoding and decoding strategies)
The encoding strategy σ and the decoding strategy τ are defined by
σ : Un −→ ∆(X n), (2)
τ : Yn ×Zn −→ ∆(Vn). (3)
Both strategies (σ, τ) are stochastic and induce a joint probability distribution Pσ,τ ∈ ∆(U
n × Zn ×
X n × Yn × Vn) over the n-sequences of symbols, defined by
Pσ,τ =
( n∏
t=1
PUtZt
)
σXn|Un
( n∏
t=1
TYt|Xt
)
τV n|Y nZn, (4)
where σXn|Un and τV n|Y nZn denote to the conditional probability distributions induced by the strategies
σ and τ .
The encoding and decoding strategies (σ, τ) are defined in the same way as for the joint source-channel
coding problem with side information at the decoder studied in [6], based on Wyner-Ziv’s setting in [5].
Unlike these previous works, we assume that the encoder and the decoder minimize distincts distortion
functions.
Definition II.2 (Distortion functions) The single-letter distortion functions of the encoder and decoder
are defined by
de : U × Z × V −→ R, (5)
dd : U × Z × V −→ R. (6)
The long-run distortion functions dne (σ, τ) and d
n
d
(σ, τ) are evaluated with respect to the probability
distribution Pσ,τ induced by the strategies (σ, τ)
dne (σ, τ) =Eσ,τ
[
1
n
n∑
t=1
de(Ut, Zt, Vt)
]
=
∑
un,zn,vn
Pσ,τ
(
un, zn, vn
)
·
[
1
n
n∑
t=1
de(ut, zt, vt)
]
, (7)
dnd (σ, τ) =
∑
un,zn,vn
Pσ,τ
(
un, zn, vn
)
·
[
1
n
n∑
t=1
dd(ut, zt, vt)
]
. (8)
B. Strategic communication scenario
In this work, the encoder and the decoder are autonomous devices that choose the encoding strategy
σ and the decoding strategy τ in order to minimize their long-run distortion dne (σ, τ) and d
n
d
(σ, τ). We
assume that the strategic communication takes place as follows:
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7• Before the transmission starts, the encoder chooses the strategy σ and announces it to the decoder.
• The sequences (Un, Zn,Xn, Y n) are drawn according to the joint probability distribution(∏n
t=1 PUtZt
)
σXn|Un
(∏n
t=1 TYt|Xt
)
.
• The decoder knows σ, observes the sequences of symbols (Y n, Zn), and is free to choose any
decoding strategy τ , in order to return a sequence of symbols V n.
This setting corresponds to the Bayesian persuasion game [7], in which the encoder commits to an
information disclosure policy σ, and the decoder chooses a decoding strategy τ accordingly.
Definition II.3 (Decoder’s Best-Replies) For any encoding strategy σ, the set of best-reply decoding
strategies BRd(σ) is defined by
BRd(σ) = argminτ d
n
d (σ, τ) =
{
τ, s.t. dnd (σ, τ) ≤ d
n
d (σ, τ˜ ), ∀τ˜ 6= τ
}
. (9)
In case there are several best-reply strategies, we assume that the decoder chooses the one that maximizes
the encoder’s distortion maxτ∈BRd(σ) d
n
e (σ, τ), so that the solution is robust to the exact specification of
decoder’s strategy.
We aim at characterizing the asymptotic behavior of
inf
σ
max
τ∈BRd(σ)
dne (σ, τ). (10)
The decoding process τ is not supervised, it is strategic, causing the mismatch of the sequence of
decoder’s outputs. The design of the encoding strategy σ anticipates this mismatch. Does the “strategic
decoder” necessarily decode the coded bits of information? We provide a positive answer in Theorem III.3,
by refining the analysis of the Wyner-Ziv’s encoding scheme [5]. More precisely, we show that the symbols
induced by Wyner-Ziv’s decoding τwz coincide with those induced by any best-reply τ ∈ BRd(σwz) to
Wyner-Ziv’s encoding σwz, for a large fraction of stages.
Remark II.4 (Stackelberg v.s. Nash equilibrium) The optimization problem in (10) corresponds to a
Stackelberg equilibrium [39] in which the encoder is the leader and the decoder is the follower, unlike
the Nash equilibrium [40] in which the two devices choose their strategy simultaneously.
Remark II.5 (Equal distortion functions) When the encoder and decoder have equal distortion func-
tions de = dd, the problem in (10) boils down to the problem studied by Merhav-Shamai in [6], in which
both strategies (σ, τ) are chosen jointly, in order to minimize a distortion function
inf
σ
max
τ∈BRd(σ)
dne (σ, τ) = inf
σ
min
τ
dne (σ, τ) = min
(σ,τ)
dne (σ, τ), (11)
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8since by Definition II.3, τ ∈ BRd(σ) ⇐⇒ dnd (σ, τ) = minτ ′ d
n
d
(σ, τ ′). For such scenario, Merhav-
Shamai’s separation result in [6], shows that it is optimal to concatenate Wyner-Ziv’s source coding with
Shannon’s channel coding.
III. CHARACTERIZATIONS
A. Linear program with an information constraint
We define the encoder’s optimal distortion D⋆e.
Definition III.1 (Target distributions) We consider an auxiliary random variable W ∈ W with |W| =
min
(
|U|+ 1, |V||Z|
)
. The set Q0 of target probability distributions is defined by
Q0 =
{
PUZQW |U , s.t., max
PX
I(X;Y )− I(U ;W |Z) ≥ 0
}
. (12)
We define the set Q2
(
QUZW
)
of single-letter best-replies of the decoder
Q2
(
QUZW
)
=argminQV |WZ E QUZW
QV |WZ
[
dd(U,Z, V )
]
. (13)
The encoder’s optimal distortion D⋆e is given by
D⋆e = inf
QUZW∈Q0
max
QV |WZ∈
Q2(QUZW )
E QUZW
QV |WZ
[
de(U,Z, V )
]
. (14)
We discuss the above definitions.
• The information constraint of the set Q0 involves the channel capacity maxPX I(X;Y ) and the
Wyner-Ziv’s information rate I(U ;W |Z) = I(U ;W )− I(W ;Z), stated in [5]. It corresponds to the
separation result by Shannon [64], extended to the Wyner-Ziv setting by Merhav-Shamai in [6].
• For the clarity of the presentation, the set Q2
(
QUZW
)
contains stochastic functions QV |WZ ,
even if for the linear problem (13) some optimal QV |WZ are deterministic. If there are several
optimal QV |WZ , we assume the decoder chooses the one that maximize encoder’s distortion:
max QV |WZ∈
Q2(QUZW )
E
[
de(U,Z, V )
]
.
• The infimum over QUZW ∈ Q0 is not a minimum since the function max QV |WZ∈
Q2(QUZW )
E
[
de(U,Z, V )
]
is not continuous with respect to QUZW , see Fig. 10 and Fig. 11.
• In [65, Theorem IV.2], the sets Q0 and Q2 correspond to the target probability distributions
QUZWQV |WZ that are achievable for the problem of empirical coordination, see also [60], [62].
As noticed in [66] and [67], the empirical coordination approach allows us to characterize the “core
of the decoder’s knowledge”, which captures what the decoder is able to infer about the random
variables involved in the problem.
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9• The value D⋆e corresponds to the Stackelberg equilibrium payoff of an auxiliary one-shot game in
which the decoder chooses QV |WZ , knowing in advance that the encoder has chosen QW |U ∈ Q0
and the distortion functions are E
[
de(U,Z, V )
]
and E
[
dd(U,Z, V )
]
.
Remark III.2 (Equal distortion functions) When the encoder and the decoder have equal distortion
functions dd = de, the set Q2
(
QUZW
)
is equal to argminQV |WZ E
[
de(U,Z, V )
]
. Thus, we have
max
QV |WZ∈
Q2(QUZW )
E QUZW
QV |WZ
[
de(U,Z, V )
]
= min
QV |WZ
E QUZW
QV |WZ
[
de(U,Z, V )
]
. (15)
Hence, the encoder’s optimal distortion D⋆e is equal to:
D⋆e = inf
QUZW∈Q0
max
QV |WZ∈
Q2(QUZW )
E QUZW
QV |WZ
[
de(U,Z, V )
]
(16)
= inf
QUZW∈Q0
min
QV |WZ
E QUZW
QV |WZ
[
de(U,Z, V )
]
(17)
= min
QUZW∈Q0,
QV |WZ
E QUZW
QV |WZ
[
de(U,Z, V )
]
. (18)
The infimum in (17) is replaced by a minimum in (18) due to the compactness of Q0 and the continuity of
minQV |WZ E
[
de(U,Z, V )
]
with respect to QUZW . We recover the distortion-rate function corresponding
to [6, Theorem 1].
B. Main result
We denote N⋆ = N \ {0} and we characterize the limit of (10).
Theorem III.3 (Main result) The encoder’s long-run distortion satisfies:
∀ε > 0, ∃n¯ ∈ N⋆, ∀n ≥ n¯, inf
σ
max
τ∈BRd(σ)
dne (σ, τ) ≤ D
⋆
e + ε, (19)
∀n ∈ N⋆, inf
σ
max
τ∈BRd(σ)
dne (σ, τ) ≥ D
⋆
e. (20)
When removing the decoder’s side information Z = ∅ and changing the infimum to a supremum, we
recover the previous result of [4, Theorem 3.1]. The sequence defined by (10) is sub-additive. Indeed,
when σ is the concatenation of several encoding strategies, the concatenation of the corresponding optimal
decoding strategies belongs to BRd(σ). Theorem III.3 and Fekete’s lemma in [68], show that the long-run
encoder’s distortion converges to its infimum.
D⋆e = lim
n→+∞
inf
σ
max
τ∈BRd(σ)
dne (σ, τ) = inf
n∈N⋆
inf
σ
max
τ∈BRd(σ)
dne (σ, τ). (21)
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C. Sketch of proof of Theorem III.3
We provide some intuitions for the main arguments of the proofs, which are given in App. B and C.
Proof of the achievability result (19). We analyse the Bayesian posterior beliefs induced by the
concatenation of Wyner-Ziv’s source encoding [5] and Shannon’s channel encoding [64]. We assume
that the channel capacity is strictly positive and we consider a probability distribution QUZW such
that 1) the information constraints are satisfied with strict inequalities, 2) the set of best-reply symbol
V⋆
(
z,QU (·|z, w)
)
of Definition III.4, is a singleton for all (z, w) ∈ Z ×W . We introduce Wyner-Ziv’s
coding rates R, RL for the messages (M,L) and we denote by η > 0 the parameter such that
R + RL = I(U ;W ) + η, (22)
RL ≤ I(Z;W )− η, (23)
R ≤ max
PX
I(X;Y )− η. (24)
We introduce the binary random variable Eδ ∈ {0, 1} for which Eδ = 0 when the messages (M,L) are
recovered by the decoder and the sequences
(
Un, Zn,W n,Xn, Y n
)
are jointly typical with tolerance
δ > 0.
The major step is to show that the posterior beliefs Pσ,Ut(·|y
n, zn, Eδ = 0) induced by the encoding
strategy σ regarding Ut at stage t ∈ {1, . . . , n}, are close on average to the target conditional probability
distribution QUt(·|wt, zt):
Eσ
[
1
n
n∑
t=1
D
(
Pσ,Ut(·|Y
n, Zn, Eδ = 0)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣QUt(·|Wt, Zt))
]
≤2δ + η +
2
n
+ 2 log2 |U| · Pσ
(
Eδ = 1
)
:= ǫ. (25)
This is the purpose of the proof of Proposition B.1, stated in Appendix B-C.
Proof of the converse result (20). For any encoding strategy σ of length n ∈ N⋆, we introduce an
auxiliary random variable W = (Y n, Z−T , T ), where T is the uniform random variable over {1, . . . , n}
and Z−T stands for (Z1, . . . , ZT−1, ZT+1, . . . Zn), where ZT has been removed. We identify (U,Z) =
(UT , ZT ) and we show that the Markov chainW−
−U−
−Z is satisfied and that the probability distribution
PUZW satisfy
P(u, z, w) =
1
n
· Pσ
(
ut, zt, y
n, z−t
)
, ∀(u,w, z, un, zn, yn). (26)
September 18, 2020 DRAFT
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We define τ˜V |WZ = τVT |Y nZn and we prove that for both encoder and decoder, the long-run distortion
writes
dne (σ, τ) =
∑
u,z,w
P(u, z, w)
∑
v
τ˜(v|w, z) · de(u, z, v), (27)
hence
τ ∈ argminτ ′
V n|Y nZn
Eσ,τ ′
[
1
n
n∑
t=1
dd(ut, zt, vt)
]
⇐⇒τ˜V |WZ ∈ Q2
(
PUZW
)
. (28)
Well known arguments from [5] and [6] show that
0 ≤max
PX
I(X;Y )− I(U ;W |Z). (29)
Therefore, for any encoding strategy σ and all n, we have
max
τ∈BRd(σ)
dne (σ, τ) ≥ inf
QUZW∈Q0
max
QV |WZ∈
Q2(QUZW )
E QUZW
QV |WZ
[
de(U,Z, V )
]
= D⋆e. (30)
D. Convex closure formulation
The convex closure of a function f is the largest convex function vex f : X → R∪{−∞} everywhere
smaller than f on X. In this section, we reformulate the encoder’s optimal distortion D⋆e in terms of
a convex closure, similarly to [7, Corollary 1] and [4, Definition 2.4]. This alternative approach may
simplify the optimization problem in (14), by plugging the decoder’s posterior beliefs and best-reply
symbols into the encoder’s distortion function. The goal of the strategic communication is to control the
posterior beliefs of the decoder, knowing it will choose a best-reply symbol afterwards.
Before the transmission, the decoder holds a prior belief corresponding to the source’s statistics PU ∈
∆(U). After observing the pair of symbols (w, z) ∈ W × Z , the decoder updates its posterior belief
QU (·|z, w) ∈ ∆(U) according to Bayes rule Q(u|z, w) =
P(u,z)Q(w|u)∑
u′ P(u
′,z)Q(w|u′) , for all (u, z, w) ∈ U×W×Z .
Lemma 1 (Markov property on posterior belief) The Markov chain property Z −
−U −
−W implies
that the posterior beliefs QU (·|z, w) ∈ ∆(U) can be expressed from the interim beliefs QU (·|w) ∈ ∆(U)
since
Q(u|w, z) =
Q(u, z, w)
Q(z, w)
=
Q(u, z|w)∑
u′ Q(u
′, z|w)
=
Q(u|w)P(z|u)∑
u′ Q(u
′|w)P(z|u′)
, ∀(u, z, w) ∈ U × Z ×W.
(31)
Definition III.4 (Best-reply) For each symbol z ∈ Z and belief p ∈ ∆(U), the decoder chooses the
best-reply v⋆(z, p) that belongs to the set V⋆(z, p), defined by
V⋆(z, p) = argmax
v∈argmin Ep
[
dd(U,z,v)
] Ep[de(U, z, v)]. (32)
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If several symbols in V are best-reply to z ∈ Z and p ∈ ∆(U), the decoder chooses the worst one for
encoder’s distortion. This is a reformulation of the maximum in (14).
Definition III.5 (Robust distortion) For a symbol z ∈ Z and a belief p ∈ ∆(U), the encoder’s robust
distortion function is defined by
ψe(z, p) = Ep
[
de
(
U, z, v⋆(z, p)
)]
, (33)
where the best-reply v⋆(z, p) belongs to the set defined by (32).
Definition III.6 (Average distortion and average entropy) For each belief p ∈ ∆(U), we define the
average distortion function Ψe(p) and average entropy function h(p) by
Ψe(p) =
∑
u,z
p(u) · P(z|u) · ψe
(
z, pU (·|z)
)
, where pU (u|z) =
p(u) · P(z|u)∑
u′ p(u
′) · P(z|u′)
∀(u, z), (34)
h(p) =H(p) +
∑
u
p(u) ·H
(
PZ(·|u)
)
−H
(∑
u
p(u) · PZ(·|u)
)
. (35)
The conditional probability distribution PZ(·|u) is given by the information source. Note that h(PU ) =
H(U |Z).
Lemma 2 (Concavity) The average entropy h(p) is concave in p ∈ ∆(U).
Proof. [Lemma 2] The average entropy h(p) in (35) is equal to the conditional entropy H(U |Z) evaluated
with respect to the probability distribution p · PZ|U ∈ ∆(U × Z). The mutual information I(U ;Z) is
convex in p ∈ ∆(U) (see [69, pp. 23]), and the entropy H(U) is concave in p ∈ ∆(U). Hence the
conditional entropy h(p) = H(U |Z) = H(U)− I(U ;Z) is concave in p ∈ ∆(U).
Theorem III.7 (Convex closure) The solution D⋆e of (14) is the convex closure of Ψe(p) evaluated at
the prior distribution PU , under an information constraint,
D⋆e = inf
{∑
w
λw ·Ψe(pw) s.t.
∑
w
λw · pw = PU ∈ ∆(U),
and
∑
w
λw · h(pw) ≥ H(U |Z)−max
PX
I(X;Y )
}
, (36)
where the infimum is taken over λw ∈ [0, 1] summing up to 1 and pw ∈ ∆(U), for each w ∈ W with
|W| = min
(
|U|+ 1, |V||Z|
)
.
The proof of Theorem III.7, stated in App. A, rely on the Markov chain property Z −
−U −
−W . When
removing, the decoder’s side information, e.g. |Z| = 1, and changing the infimum into a supremum,
we recover the value of the optimal splitting problem of [4, Definition 2.4]. The “splitting Lemma” by
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Aumann and Maschler [70], also called “Bayes plausibility” in [7], ensures that the strategy Q(w|u) =
λw·pw(u)
P(u) induces the collection of posterior beliefs (λw, pw)w∈W , also referred to as “the splitting of the
prior belief”. Formulation (36) provides an alternative point of view on the encoder’s optimal distortion
(14).
• The optimal solution D⋆e can be found by adapting the concavification method [70], to the
minimization problem. In Sec IV, we compute explicitly the optimal strategy for the Wyner-Ziv’s
example of the doubly symmetric binary source (DSBS), in [5, Sec. II].
• When the channel is perfect and has a large input alphabet |X | ≥ min(|U|, |V||Z|), the optimal
solution is obtained by removing the information constraint (36). This noise-free setting is related
to the problem of persuasion with heterogeneous beliefs, investigated in [44] and [45].
• The information constraint
∑
w λw · h(pw) ≥ H(U |Z)−maxPX I(X;Y ) in (36) is a reformulation
of I(U ;W |Z) ≤ maxPX I(X;Y ) in (12), since∑
w
λw · h(pw) =
∑
w
λw ·H(U |Z,W = w) = H(U |Z,W ). (37)
• The dimension of the problem (36) is |U|. Caratheodory’s Lemma (see [71, Corollary 17.1.5, pp.
157] and [4, Corollary A.2, pp. 26]) provides the cardinality bound |W| = |U|+ 1.
• The cardinality of W is also restricted by the vector of recommended symbols |W| = |V||Z|, telling
to the decoder which symbol v ∈ V to return when the side information is z ∈ Z . Otherwise assume
that two posteriors pw1 and pw2 induce the same vectors of symbols v
1 = (v11 , . . . , v
1
|Z|) = v
2 =
(v21 , . . . , v
2
|Z|). Then, both posteriors pw1 and pw2 can be replaced by their average:
p˜ =
λw1 · pw1 + λw2 · pw2
λw1 + λw2
, (38)
without changing the distortion and still satisfying the information constraint:
h(p˜) ≥
λw1 · h(pw1) + λw2 · h(pw2)
λw1 + λw2
(39)
=⇒
∑
w 6=w1,
w 6=w2
λw · h(pw) + (λw1 + λw2) · h(p˜) ≥ H(U |Z)−max
PX
I(X;Y ). (40)
Inequality (39) comes from the concavity of h(p), stated in Lemma 2.
The splitting under information constraint of Theorem III.7 can be reformulated in terms of Lagrangian
and in terms of the convex closure of Ψ˜e(p, ν) defined by
Ψ˜e(p, ν) =
Ψe(p), if ν ≤ h(p),+∞, otherwise. (41)
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Theorem III.8 The optimal solution D⋆e reformulates as:
D⋆e =sup
t≥0
{
vex
[
Ψe + t · h
](
PU
)
− t ·
(
H(U |Z)−max
PX
I(X;Y )
)}
(42)
=vex Ψ˜e
(
PU ,H(U |Z)−max
PX
I(X;Y )
)
. (43)
Equation (42) is the convex closure of a Lagrangian that integrates the information constraint and equation
(43) corresponds to the convex closure of a a bi-variate function where the information constraint requires
an additional dimension. The proof follows directly from [4, Theorem 3.3, pp. 37], by replacing concave
closure by convex closure.
IV. EXAMPLE WITH BINARY SOURCE AND SIDE INFORMATION
We consider a binary source U ∈ {u0, u1} with probability distribution P(u1) = p0 ∈ [0, 1]. The
binary side information Z ∈ {z0, z1} is drawn according to the conditional probability distribution
P(z|u) with parameter δ0 ∈ [0, 1] and δ1 ∈ [0, 1]. In this section, we consider distortion functions de
and dd that do not depend on the side information Z . The cardinality bound in Definition III.1 is |W| =
min
(
|U|+1, |V||Z|
)
= 3, hence the random variable W is drawn according to the conditional probability
distribution Q(w|u) with parameters (αk, βk)k∈{1,2,3} ∈ [0, 1]
6 such that
∑
k αk =
∑
k βk = 1. The joint
probability distribution P(u, z)Q(w|u) is depicted in Fig. 2.
u1
u0
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
w3
w1
w2
z1
z0
α1
β3
1− p0
p0
α3
α2
β1
β2
1− δ0
δ0
1− δ1
δ1
Fig. 2. Joint probability distribution P(u, z)Q(w|u) depending on parameters p0, δ0, δ1, (αk, βk)k∈{1,2,3}.
The encoder minimizes the Hamming distortion de(u, v) given by Fig. 3. The decoder’s distortion in
Fig. 4 includes an extra cost κ ∈ [0, 1] when it returns the symbol v1 instead of the symbol v0. The extra
cost κ may capture a computing cost, an energy cost, or the fact that an estimation error for the symbol
v1 is more harmful than an estimation error for the symbol v0.
A. Decoder’s best-reply
After receiving the pair of symbols (w, z), the decoder updates its posterior belief QU (·|w, z) ∈ ∆(U),
according to Bayes rule. We denote by p = Q(u1|w, z) ∈ [0, 1] the parameter of the posterior belief.
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u1
u0
v0 v1
0
1
1
0
Fig. 3. Encoder’s distortion function de(u, v).
u1
u0
v0 v1
0
1
1 + κ
κ
Fig. 4. Decoder’s distortion dd(u, v) with extra cost κ ∈ [0, 1].
Given the extra cost is κ = 34 and we denote by γ =
1+κ
2 =
7
8 the belief threshold at which the decoder
changes its symbol, as in Fig. 5. When the decoder’s belief is exactly equal to the threshold p = γ = 78 ,
the decoder is indifferent between the two symbols {v0, v1}, by convention we assume that it chooses
v0, i.e. the worst symbol for the encoder. Hence the decoder chooses a best-reply v⋆0 or v
⋆
1 depending on
the interval [0, γ] or (γ, 1] in which lies the belief parameter p ∈ [0, 1], see Fig. 5.
0 1 p
Ep
[
dd(U, v)
]
1 + κ = 74
κ = 34
1
v1
v0
γ
=
1+
κ2
=
7
8
b
Fig. 5. Decoder’s expected distortion Ep
[
dd(U, v)
]
= (1 − p) · dd(u0, v) + p · dd(u1, v) for v ∈ {v0, v1}, depending on the
belief parameter p = Q(u1|w, z) ∈ [0, 1]. For an extra cost κ = 34 , the decoder’s best-reply is the symbol v
⋆
0 if the posterior
belief p ∈ [0, γ] and v⋆1 if p ∈ (γ, 1] with γ =
7
8
.
B. Interim and posterior belief
The correlation between random variables (U,Z) is fixed whereas the correlation between random
variables (U,W ) is selected by the encoder. This imposes a strong relationship between the iterim belief
QU |W induced by the encoder, and the posterior belief QU |WZ that determine the decoder’s best-reply
symbol v. For a symbol w ∈ W , we denote the interim belief by q = Q(u1|w) ∈ [0, 1]. Lemma 1 ensures
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that the posterior belief depending on the side information z0 or z1, are given by
Q(u1|w, z0) =
Q(u1|w) · P(z0|u1)
Q(u0|w) · P(z0|u0) +Q(u1|w) · P(z0|u1)
=
q · δ1
(1− q) · (1− δ0) + q · δ1
=: p0(q), (44)
Q(u1|w, z1) =
Q(u1|w) · P(z1|u1)
Q(u0|w) · P(z1|u0) +Q(u1|w) · P(z1|u1)
=
q · (1− δ1)
(1− q) · δ0 + q · (1− δ1)
=: p1(q). (45)
The posterior beliefs after receiving the side information z0 or z1 are related to the interim belief q ∈ [0, 1]
through the two functions p0(q), p1(q), depicted on Fig. 6.
0
1
1 qp
0 =
0.5
p0 = P(u1) = 0.5
P(u1|z0) = 0.344828
P(u1|z1) = 0.909091
b
b
b
b
b b
b
p1
γ = 0.875
ν
0 =
0.930069
ν
1 =
0.411765
bb
bb b
b
b
b
b p0(ν1) = 0.269231
p1(ν0) = 0.992537
p1(q)
p0(q)
Fig. 6. The posterior beliefs functions p0(q) and p1(q) defined in (44) and (45), depending on the interim belief q ∈ [0, 1], for
p0 = 0.5, δ1 = 0.05, δ2 = 0.5 and γ = 0.875.
C. Encoder’s average distortion function
Given the belief threshold γ = 78 at which the decoder changes its symbol, we define the parameters
ν0 and ν1 such that p0(ν0) = γ and p1(ν1) = γ.
γ = p0(ν0) ⇐⇒ ν0 =
γ · (1− δ0)
δ1 · (1− γ) + γ · (1− δ0)
, (46)
γ = p1(ν1) ⇐⇒ ν1 =
γ · δ0
γ · δ0 + (1− δ1) · (1− γ)
. (47)
Remark IV.1 We have the equivalence ν1 < ν0 ⇐⇒ δ0 + δ1 < 1.
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Since the distortion functions given in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 do not depend on the side information z, we
denote by ψe(p) the robust distortion function of Definition III.5, given by
ψe(p) = min
v∈argmin
(1−p)·d
d
(u0,v)+p·dd(u1,v)
(1− p) · de(u0, v) + p · de(u1, v), (48)
= 1
(
p ≤ γ
)
·
(
(1− p) · de(u0, v0) + p · de(u1, v0)
)
+ 1
(
p > γ
)
·
(
(1− p) · de(u0, v1) + p · de(u1, v1)
)
(49)
= p · 1
(
p ≤ γ
)
+ (1− p) · 1
(
p > γ
)
. (50)
Without loss of generality, we assume that δ0 + δ1 < 1, hence ν1 < ν0. The average distortion function
Ψe(q) of Definition III.6 depends on the interim belief parameter q ∈ [0, 1] as follows
Ψe(q) =Pq(z0) · ψe
(
p0(q)
)
+ Pq(z1) · ψe
(
p1(q)
)
(51)
=
(
(1− q) · (1− δ0) + q · δ1
)
·
(
p0(q) · 1
(
p0(q) ≤ γ
)
+ (1− p0(q)) · 1
(
p0(q) > γ
))
+
(
(1− q) · δ0 + q · (1− δ1)
)
·
(
p1(q) · 1
(
p1(q) ≤ γ
)
+ (1− p1(q)) · 1
(
p1(q) > γ
))
(52)
=q · 1
(
q ≤ ν1
)
+
(
q · δ1 + (1− q) · δ0
)
· 1
(
ν1 < q ≤ ν0
)
+ (1− q) · 1
(
q > ν0
)
. (53)
In Fig. 7, Fig. 8 and Fig. 11, the average distortion function Ψe(q) are represented by the orange lines,
whereas the black curve is the average entropy h(q) defined by
h(q) =Hb(q) + (1− q) ·Hb(δ0) + q ·Hb(δ1)−Hb
(
(1− q) · δ0 + q · (1− δ1)
)
. (54)
D. Optimal splitting with three posteriors
Since the cardinality bound is |W| = min
(
|U| + 1, |V||Z|
)
= 3, we consider a splitting of the prior
p0 in three posteriors (q1, q2, q3) ∈ [0, 1]3 with respective weights (λ1, λ2, λ3) ∈ [0, 1]3, defined by (55),
(56).
1 =λ1 + λ2 + λ3, (55)
p0 =λ1 · q1 + λ2 · q2 + λ3 · q3, (56)
H(U |Z)− C =λ1 · h(q1) + λ2 · h(q2) + λ3 · h(q3), (57)
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Equation (57) is satisfied when the information constraint is binding. By inverting the system (55)-(57),
we obtain
λ1 =
(
H(U |Z)−C
)
· (q2 − q3) + h(q2) · (q3 − p0) + h(q3) · (p0 − q2)
h(q1) · (q2 − q3) + h(q2) · (q3 − q1) + h(q3) · (q1 − q2)
, (58)
λ2 =
(
H(U |Z)−C
)
· (q3 − q1) + h(q3) · (q1 − p0) + h(q1) · (p0 − q3)
h(q1) · (q2 − q3) + h(q2) · (q3 − q1) + h(q3) · (q1 − q2)
, (59)
λ3 =
(
H(U |Z)−C
)
· (q1 − q2) + h(q1) · (q2 − p0) + h(q2) · (p0 − q1)
h(q1) · (q2 − q3) + h(q2) · (q3 − q1) + h(q3) · (q1 − q2)
. (60)
The triple of posteriors (q1, q2, q3) is feasible if and only if the weights (λ1, λ2, λ3) belong to the interval
[0, 1]3. The average distortion Ψe(q) is piece-wise linear, hence the optimal triple of posteriors may
belong to distinct intervals q1 ∈ [0, ν1), q2 ∈ [ν1, ν2), q3 ∈ [ν2, 1]. Otherwise, take the average of two
posteriors of the same interval which provides the same distortion value and has a larger entropy, due to
the strict concavity of entropy function.
Aumann and Maschler’s splitting lemma [70] or Kamenica and Gentzkow’s Bayes plausibility [7] claim
that the splitting p0 = λ1 · q1 + λ2 · q2 + λ3 · q3 is implemented by the following strategy
Q(wk|u0) =Q(wk) ·
1−Q(u1|wk)
1− P(u1)
= λk ·
1− qk
1− p0
=: αk, k ∈ {, 1, 2, 3} (61)
Q(wk|u1) =Q(wk) ·
Q(u1|wk)
P(u1)
= λk ·
qk
p0
=: βk, k ∈ {, 1, 2, 3}. (62)
0
1
1 q
b
q
2 =
p
0 =
0.5
b b
ν
1 =
0.7
ν
2 =
0.3
δ0 = δ1 = 0.3
bb
b
b
H(U |Z)− C = 0.6813
h(q⋆) = 0.5375
b b
b
b
b
b
q
3 =
1−
q ⋆
=
0.855
q
1 =
q ⋆
=
0.145
b b
b b D⋆e = 0.2098
Fig. 7. Wyner-Ziv’s example for DSBS. When C ∈ [0, H(U |Z)− h(q⋆)] the optimal splitting is (q1, q2, q3) = (q
⋆, 1
2
, 1− q⋆).
For the parameters p0 = 0.5, δ0 = δ1 = 0.3, C = 0.2, κ = 0, the optimal encoder’s distortion is D
⋆
e = 0.2098.
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0
1
1 q
b
q
2 =
p
0 =
0.5
b b
ν
1 =
0.7
ν
2 =
0.3
δ0 = δ1 = 0.3
b
b
b
b
b b
H(U |Z)− C = 0.4813
h(q⋆) = 0.5375
b b
b b
1
−
q ⋆
=
0.855
q ⋆
=
0.145
q
3 =
0.8788
q
1 =
0.1212
b bb b
b D⋆e = 0.1212
Fig. 8. Wyner-Ziv’s example for DSBS. When C ∈ [H(U |Z) − h(q⋆),H(U |Z)] the optimal splitting has two posteriors
(q1, q3) =
(
h−1
(
H(U |Z) − C
)
, 1 − h−1
(
H(U |Z) − C
))
. For parameters p0 = 0.5, δ0 = δ1 = 0.3, C = 0.4, κ = 0, the
optimal encoder’s distortion is D⋆e = 0.1212.
E. Wyner-Ziv’s example for DSBS with p0 = 0.5, δ0 = δ1 = 0.3, κ = 0
We investigate the example of doubly symmetric binary source (DSBS) with δ0 = δ1 = 0.3 whose
solution is characterized in [5, Sec. II, pp. 3]. In this example, both encoder and decoder minimize the
Hamming distortion, hence κ = 0⇐⇒ γ = 12 . We introduce the notation q ⋆ δ := (1− q) · δ+ q · (1− δ),
the average distortion and average entropy write
Ψe(q) =q · 1
(
q ≤ δ
)
+ δ · 1
(
δ < q ≤ 1− δ
)
+ (1− q) · 1
(
q > 1− δ
)
, (63)
h(q) =H(U |Z) +Hb(q)−Hb
(
q ⋆ δ
)
, (64)
We remark that H(U |Z)− h(q) = Hb
(
q ⋆ δ
)
−Hb(q).
Proposition IV.2 We denote by q⋆ the unique solution of
h′(q) =
H(U |Z)− h(q)
δ − q
. (65)
1) If C ∈ [0,H(U |Z)− h(q⋆)], then the optimal splitting (Fig. 7) has three posterior beliefs
q1 = q
⋆ q2 =
1
2 q3 = 1− q
⋆
λ1 =
1
2 ·
C
H(U |Z)−h(q⋆) λ2 = 1−
C
H(U |Z)−h(q⋆) λ3 =
1
2 ·
C
H(U |Z)−h(q⋆)
corresponding to the strategies
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0
C
1 D⋆e
b
p
0 =
0.5
q ⋆
=
0.145
δ
=
0.3
b
b
b
b
b
b b
H(U |Z) = 0.8813
H(U |Z)− h(q⋆) = 0.3438
H(U |Z)− h(δ) = 0.1002
Fig. 9. Optimal trade-off between the capacity C and the optimal distortion D⋆e for the DSBS with parameters p0 = 0.5,
δ0 = δ1 = 0.3, κ = 0.
α1 = (1− q
⋆) · C
H(U |Z)−h(q⋆) α2 = 1−
C
H(U |Z)−h(q⋆) α3 = q
⋆ · C
H(U |Z)−h(q⋆)
β1 = q
⋆ · C
H(U |Z)−h(q⋆) β2 = 1−
C
H(U |Z)−h(q⋆) β3 = (1− q
⋆) · C
H(U |Z)−h(q⋆)
and the optimal distortion is
D⋆e =δ − C ·
δ − q⋆
H(U |Z)− h(q⋆)
(66)
2) If C ∈ [H(U |Z)− h(q⋆),H(U |Z)], then the optimal splitting (Fig. 8) has two posterior beliefs
q1 = h
−1
(
H(U |Z)− C
)
q2 =
1
2 q3 = 1− h
−1
(
H(U |Z)− C
)
λ1 =
1
2 λ2 = 0 λ3 =
1
2
corresponding to the strategies
α1 = 1− h
−1
(
H(U |Z)− C
)
α2 = 0 α3 = h
−1
(
H(U |Z)− C
)
β1 = h
−1
(
H(U |Z)− C
)
β2 = 0 β3 = 1− h
−1
(
H(U |Z)− C
)
and the optimal distortion is
D⋆e =h
−1
(
H(U |Z)− C
)
, (67)
where the notation h−1
(
H(U |Z)−C
)
stands for the unique solution of equation h(q) = H(U |Z)−C .
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3) If C > H(U |Z), then the optimal splitting rely on the two extreme posterior beliefs (0, 1) and
D⋆e = 0.
The proof of Proposition IV.2 is given in the Appendix D. When C ≤ H(U |Z) − h(q⋆), the optimal
strategy consists of a time-sharing between the operating point (D⋆e, C) =
(
q⋆,H(U |Z)−h(q⋆)
)
and the
zero rate point (δ, 0), as depicted in Fig. 9.
F. Distinct distortions without side information, p0 = 0.5, δ0 = 0.5, δ1 = 0.5, C = 0.2, κ =
3
4
0
11
1 qp0 =
0.5
b
q
2 =
γ
=
0.875
b
bbH(U)− C
b
b
b
b
q
1 =
0.3308
b b
b
D⋆e = 0.2668
Fig. 10. For the parameters p0 = 0.5, δ1 = δ2 = 0.5, C = 0.2, κ = 34 , the optimal encoder’s distortion D
⋆
e = 0.2668.
We consider that the parameters δ1 = δ2 = 0.5 so that the side information Z is independent of
the source U . This corresponds to the problem studied in [4], when replacing the minimization by the
maximization. We have Hb(δ0) = Hb(δ1) = Hb
(
(1 − q) · δ0 + q · (1 − δ1)
)
= 1 and ν1 = ν2 = γ =
7
8 ,
the average entropy and average distortion write
h(q) =Hb(q), (68)
Ψe(q) =ψe(q) = p · 1
(
p ≤ γ
)
+ (1− p) · 1
(
p > γ
)
. (69)
Applying [4, Corollary 3.5, pp. 15], the optimal splitting has two posteriors |W| = 2 and must satisfy
the information constraint
p0 − q2
q1 − q2
·Hb(q1) +
q1 − p0
q1 − q2
·Hb(q2) ≥ H(U)− C. (70)
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The distortion function has two piece-wise linear components, hence the optimal splitting involves q1 ∈
[0, p0] and q2 ∈ [γ, 1]. For each q2 ∈ [γ, 1], we denote by q1(q2) the function that returns the posterior
which satisfies (70) with equality. From [4, Fig. 5, pp. 19], the function q1(q2) is strictly increasing,
hence its derivative q′1(q2) is strictly positive. The encoder’s distortion function reformulates in terms of
q2 as
Φe(q2) =
p0 − q2
q1(q2)− q2
· q1(q2) +
q1 − p0
q1(q2)− q2
· (1− q2). (71)
Its derivative writes
Φ′e(q2) =
1
(q1(q2)− q2)2
·
(
q′1(q2) ·
(
q2 · (2 · q2 − 1) + p0
)
− (p0 − q1(q2)) · (1− 2 · q1(q2))
)
. (72)
Since q2 ≥ γ >
1
2 , the sign of the derivative is negative if and only if
0 < q′1(q2) ≤
(p0 − q1(q2)) · (1− 2 · q1(q2))
q2 · (2 · q2 − 1) + p0
. (73)
By numerical optimization, the above inequality is satisfied for p0 = 0.5, δ1 = δ2 = 0.5, C = 0.2, κ =
3
4 ,
hence the optimal distortion is achieved by using q2 = γ, as depicted on Fig. 10.
0
1
1 q
b
p
0 =
0.5
b b
q ⋆
3 =
ν
1 =
0.9301
q ⋆
2 =
ν
2 =
0.4178
bb
b
q ⋆
1 =
0.0715
H(U |Z)− C = 0.5947
b
b b
b
b b
bbD⋆e = 0.1721
Fig. 11. For the parameters p0 = 0.5, δ0 = 0.05, δ1 = 0.5, C = 0.2, κ = 34 , the optimal encoder’s distortion is D
⋆
e = 0.1721.
G. Distinct distortions with side information, p0 = 0.5, δ0 = 0.05, δ1 = 0.5, C = 0.2, κ =
3
4
We consider an example with distinct distortion functions, i.e. with κ = 34 , with decoder’s side
information. By numerical simulation, we determine the optimal triple of posteriors (q1, q2, q3) represented
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by the red dots in Fig. 11, that corresponds to the minimal distortion D⋆e = 0.1721.
q1 = 0.0715 q2 = 0.4118 q3 = 0.9301
λ1 = 0.1288 λ2 = 0.6165 λ3 = 0.2548
The parameters of the optimal strategy in Fig. 2, are given by
α1 = 0.2392 α2 = 0.7252 α2 = 0.0356
β1 = 0.0184 β2 = 0.5077 β3 = 0.4739
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM III.7
We consider a joint probability distribution QUW ∈ ∆(U×W), we identify the parameters λw = Q(w)
and pw = QU (·|w) ∈ ∆(U). The average distortion writes∑
w
λw ·Ψe(pw) =
∑
w
Q(w) ·Ψe
(
QU (·|w)
)
(74)
=
∑
w
Q(w) ·
∑
u,z
Q(u|w) · P(z|u) · ψe
(
z,QU (·|w, z)
)
(75)
=
∑
w,z
Q(w) · Q(z|w) · EQU(·|w,z)
[
de
(
U, z, v⋆
(
z,QU (·|w, z)
))]
(76)
=EQUZW
[
de
(
U,Z, V ⋆
(
Z,QU (·|W,Z)
))]
(77)
= max
QV |ZW ∈
Q2(QUZW )
E QUZW
QV |ZW
[
de(U,Z, V )
]
. (78)
Equations (75), (76) and (78) come from Definitions III.6, III.5 and III.4.
Equations (74) and (77) are reformulations.
The average entropy writes∑
w
λw · h(pw) =
∑
w
Q(w) · h
(
QU (·|w)
)
(79)
=
∑
w
Q(w) ·
(
H
(
QU (·|w)
)
+
∑
u
Q(u|w) ·H
(
PZ(·|u)
)
−H
(∑
u
Q(u|w) · PZ(·|u)
))
(80)
=
∑
w
Q(w) ·
(
H
(
QU (·|w)
)
+
∑
u
Q(u|w) ·H
(
QZ(·|u,w)
)
−H
(
QZ(·|w)
))
(81)
=H(U |W ) +H(Z|U,W )−H(Z|W ) = H(U |W,Z). (82)
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Equation (80) come from Definition III.6.
Equation (81) come from Markov chain property Z −
−U −
−W that implies PZ(·|u) = QZ(·|u,w) and
QZ(·|w) =
∑
uQ(u|w) · PZ(·|u).
Equations (79) and (82) are reformulations.
Hence, equation (36) reformulates
inf
λw∈[0,1],
pw∈∆(U)
{∑
w
λw ·Ψe(pw) s.t.
∑
w
λw · pw = PU ∈ ∆(U),
and
∑
w
λw · h(pw) ≥ H(U |Z)−max
PX
I(X;Y )
}
(83)
= inf
QW ,QU|W
{
max
QV |ZW∈
Q2(QUZW )
E QUZW
QV |ZW
[
de(U,Z, V )
]
s.t.
∑
w
Q(w) · QU (·|w) = PU ∈ ∆(U),
and H(U |W,Z) ≥ H(U |Z)−max
PX
I(X;Y )
}
(84)
= inf
QUZW∈Q0
max
QV |ZW∈
Q2(QUZW )
E QUZW
×QV |ZW
[
de(U,Z, V )
]
= D⋆e. (85)
This concludes the proof of Theorem III.7.
APPENDIX B
ACHIEVABILITY PROOF OF THEOREM III.3
We refine the analysis of the Wyner-Ziv’s source encoding scheme [5], in order to control the posterior
beliefs of a large fraction of stages, as stated in Proposition B.1 and in (97)-(98). Corollary B.3 shows
that the best-reply strategy of the decoder performs similarly as the Wyner-Ziv’s decoding scheme.
A. Zero capacity
We first investigate the special case of zero capacity.
Lemma 3 If the channel has zero capacity maxPX I(X;Y ) = 0, then we have:
∀n ∈ N⋆, ∀σ, max
τ∈BRd(σ)
dne (σ, τ) = D
⋆
e. (86)
Proof. [Lemma 3] When capacity is zero maxPX I(X;Y ) = 0, then the probability distribution
PUZQW |U ∈ Q0 must satisfy I(U ;W |Z) = 0, hence the Markov chain property U −
− Z −
− W ,
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i.e. QU |ZW = PU |Z .
D⋆e = inf
QUZW∈Q0
max
QV |WZ∈
Q2(QUZW )
E QUZW
QV |WZ
[
de(U,Z, V )
]
(87)
= inf
QUZW∈Q0
EQUZW
[
de
(
U,Z, V ⋆
(
Z,QU (·|W,Z)
))]
(88)
= inf
QUZW∈Q0
EQUZW
[
de
(
U,Z, V ⋆
(
Z,PU (·|Z)
))]
(89)
=EPUZ
[
de
(
U,Z, V ⋆
(
Z,PU (·|Z)
))]
. (90)
Equation (88) is a reformulation by using the best-reply v⋆
(
z, p
)
of Definition III.4 for symbol z ∈ Z
and the belief QU (·|w, z).
Equation (89) comes from Markov chain property U −
− Z −
− W that allows to replace the belief
QU (·|w, z) by PU (·|z).
Equation (90) comes from removing the random variable W since it has no impact on the distortion
function de
(
u, z, v⋆
(
z,PU (·|z)
))
.
For any n and for any encoding strategy σ, the encoder’s long-run distortion is given by
max
τ∈BRd(σ)
dne (σ, τ) = max
τ∈BRd(σ)
∑
un,zn,xn,
yn,vn
n∏
t=1
P
(
ut, zt
)
σ
(
xn
∣∣un) n∏
t=1
T
(
yt
)
τ
(
vn
∣∣yn, zn) · [ 1
n
n∑
t=1
de(ut, zt, vt)
]
(91)
= max
τ∈BRd(σ)
∑
un,zn,vn
n∏
t=1
P
(
ut, zt
)
τ
(
vn
∣∣zn) · [ 1
n
n∑
t=1
de(ut, zt, vt)
]
(92)
=
1
n
n∑
t=1
[ ∑
ut,zt,vt
P
(
ut, zt
)
· 1
(
vt = v
⋆
(
zt,QU (·|zt)
))
· de(ut, zt, vt)
]
(93)
= EP(u,z)
[
de
(
U,Z, V ⋆
(
Z,PU (·|Z)
))]
. (94)
Equation (91) comes from the zero capacity which imposes that the channel outputs Y n are independent
of the channel inputs Xn.
Equation (92) comes from removing the random variables (Xn, Y n) and noting that the decoder’s best-
reply τ
(
vn
∣∣zn) does not depend on yn anymore, since yn is independent of (un, zn).
Equation (93) is a reformulation based on the best-reply v⋆
(
z,PU (·|z)
)
of Definition III.4, for the symbol
z ∈ Z and the belief PU (·|z).
Equation (94) comes from the i.i.d. property of (U,Z) and concludes the proof of Lemma 3.
September 18, 2020 DRAFT
26
B. Strictly positive capacity
We now assume that the channel capacity is strictly positive maxPX I(X;Y ) > 0. We define a specific
convex closure in which the information constraint is satisfied with strict inequality and the sets of
decoder’s best-reply symbols are always singletons.
D̂e = inf
{∑
w
λw ·Ψe(pw) s.t.
∑
w
λw · pw = PU ∈ ∆(U),
and
∑
w
λw · h(pw) > H(U |Z)−max
PX
I(X;Y ),
and ∀(z, w) ∈ Z ×W, V⋆
(
z,QU (·|z, w)
)
is a singleton
}
. (95)
Lemma 4 If maxPX I(X;Y ) > 0, then D̂e = D
⋆
e .
For the proof of Lemma 4, we refers to the similar proof of [4, Lemma A.5, pp. 32]. We denote by P⋆X
the probability distribution that maximizes the mutual information I(X;Y ), we denote by QnUZW the
empirical distribution of the sequence (un, zn, wn) and we denote by Aδ the set of typical sequences
with tolerance δ > 0, defined by
Aδ =
{
(un, zn, wn, xn, yn), s.t. ||QnUZW − PUZQW |U ||1 ≤ δ,
and ||QnXY − P
⋆
XTY |X ||1 ≤ δ
}
. (96)
We denote by Pσ,Ut(·|y
n, zn) ∈ ∆(U) the posterior belief induced by the strategy σ on Ut at stage t,
given (yn, zn). We define Tα(wn, yn, zn) and Bα,γ,δ depending on parameters α > 0 and γ > 0:
Tα(w
n, yn, zn) =
{
t ∈ {1, . . . , n}, s.t. D
(
Pσ,Ut(·|y
n, zn)
∣∣∣∣∣∣QUt(·|wt, zt)) ≤ α22 ln 2
}
, (97)
Bα,γ,δ =
{
(wn, yn, zn), s.t.
|Tα(w
n, yn, zn)|
n
≥ 1− γ and (wn, yn, zn) ∈ Aδ
}
. (98)
The notation Bcα,γ,δ stands for the complementary set of Bα,γ,δ ⊂ W
n × Yn × Zn. The sequences
(wn, yn, zn) belong to the set Bα,γ,δ if, 1) they are typical, 2) the corresponding posterior belief
Pσ,Ut(·|y
n, zn) is close in K-L divergence to the target belief QUt(·|wt, zt), for a large fraction of stages
t ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
The cornerstone of this achievability proof is Proposition B.1, which refines the analysis of Wyner-Ziv’s
source coding by controlling the posterior beliefs of a large fraction of stages.
Proposition B.1 (Wyner-Ziv’s Posterior Beliefs) If the probability distribution PUZQW |U satisfies: maxPX I(X;Y )− I(U ;W |Z) > 0,V⋆(z,QU (·|z, w)) is a singleton ∀(z, w) ∈ Z ×W, (99)
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then
∀ε > 0, ∀α > 0, ∀γ > 0, ∃δ¯ > 0, ∀δ < δ¯, ∃n¯ ∈ N⋆, ∀n ≥ n¯,∃σ, s.t. Pσ(B
c
α,γ,δ) ≤ ε. (100)
The proof of proposition B.1 is stated in App. B-C.
Proposition B.2 For any encoding strategy σ, we have:∣∣∣∣ max
τ∈BRd(σ)
dne (σ, τ)− D̂e
∣∣∣∣ ≤ (α+ 2γ + δ) · d¯e + (1− Pσ(Bα,γ,δ)) · d¯e, (101)
where d¯e = maxu,z,v
∣∣de(u, z, v)∣∣ is the largest absolute value of encoder’s distortion.
For the proof of Proposition B.2, we refers directly to the similar proof of [4, Lemma A.8, pp. 33].
Corollary B.3 For any ε > 0, there exists n¯ ∈ N⋆ such that for all n ≥ n¯ there exists an encoding
strategy σ such that: ∣∣∣∣ max
τ∈BRd(σ)
dne (σ, τ) − D̂e
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε. (102)
The proof of Corollary B.3 comes from combining Proposition B.1 with Proposition B.2 and choosing
parameters α, γ, δ small and n ∈ N⋆ large. The decoder’s best-reply performs similarly as the Wyner-Ziv’s
decoding scheme. It concludes the achievability proof of Theorem III.3.
C. Proof of Proposition B.1
We assume that the probability distribution PUZQW |U satisfies the two following conditions: maxPX I(X;Y )− I(U ;W |Z) > 0,V⋆(z,QU (·|z, w)) is a singleton ∀(z, w) ∈ Z ×W. (103)
The strict information constraint ensures that there exists a small parameter η > 0 and rates R ≥ 0,
RL ≥ 0, such that
R + RL = I(U ;W ) + η, (104)
RL ≤ I(Z;W )− η, (105)
R ≤ max
PX
I(X;Y )− η. (106)
We now recall the random coding constructions of Wyner-Ziv and Shannon for the source and the channel,
in [5] and [64]. Then, we investigate the decoder’s posterior beliefs regarding the sequence of symbols
of source. We denote by Σ the random coding scheme, described as follows.
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• Random codebook. We introduces the indices m ∈ M with |M| = 2nR and l ∈ ML with |ML| =
2nRL . We draw |M ×ML| = 2n(R+RL) sequences W n(m, l) with the i.i.d. probability distribution
Q⊗nW , and |M| = 2
nR sequencesXn(m), with the i.i.d. probability distribution P⋆⊗nX that maximizes
the channel capacity in (106).
• Encoding function. The encoder observes the sequence of symbols of source Un ∈ Un and finds a
pair of indices (m, l) ∈ M×ML such that the sequences
(
Un,W n(m, l)
)
∈ Aδ are jointly typical.
It sends the sequence Xn(m) corresponding to the index m ∈ M.
• Decoding function. The decoder observes the sequence of channel output Y n ∈ Yn. It returns an
index mˆ ∈ M such that the sequences
(
Y n,Xn(mˆ)
)
∈ Aδ are jointly typical. Then it observes
the sequence of side information Zn ∈ Zn and returns an index lˆ ∈ ML such that the sequences(
Zn,W n(mˆ, lˆ)
)
∈ Aδ are jointly typical.
• Error Event. We introduce the event of error Eδ ∈ {0, 1} defined as follows:
Eδ =
{
0 if (M,L) = (Mˆ , Lˆ) and
(
Un, Zn,W n,Xn, Y n
)
∈ Aδ,
1 otherwise.
(107)
Expected error probability of the random coding scheme Σ. For all ε2 > 0, for all η > 0, there exists
a δ¯ > 0, for all δ ≤ δ¯ there exists n¯ such that for all n ≥ n¯, the expected probability of the following
error events are bounded by ε2:
EΣ
[
P
(
∀(m, l),
(
Un,W n(m, l)
)
/∈ Aδ
)]
≤ ε2, (108)
EΣ
[
P
(
∃l′ 6= l, s.t.
(
Zn,W n(m, l′)
)
∈ Aδ
)]
≤ ε2, (109)
EΣ
[
P
(
∃m′ 6= m, s.t.
(
Y n,Xn(m′)
)
∈ Aδ
)]
≤ ε2, (110)
Equation (108) comes from (104) and the covering lemma [69, pp. 208].
Equation (109) comes from (105) and the packing lemma [69, pp. 46].
Equation (110) comes from (106) and the packing lemma [69, pp. 46].
We conclude that
∀ε2 > 0, ∀η > 0, ∃δ¯ > 0, ∀δ ≤ δ¯, ∃n¯ > 0, ∀n ≥ n¯, ∃σ, Pσ
(
Eδ = 1
)
≤ ε2. (111)
Control of the posterior beliefs. We assume that the event Eδ = 0 is realized. We denote by
Pσ,Ut(·|y
n, zn, Eδ = 0) the conditional probability distribution of Ut given (yn, zn, E = 0), induced by
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the encoding strategy σ obtained by the concatenation of Wyner-Ziv’s encoding scheme and Shannon’s
channel encoding scheme.
Eσ
[
1
n
n∑
t=1
D
(
Pσ,Ut(·|Y
n, Zn, Eδ = 0)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣QUt(·|Wt, Zt))
]
=
∑
(wn,zn,yn)∈Aδ
Pσ(w
n, zn, yn|Eδ = 0)×
1
n
n∑
t=1
D
(
Pσ,Ut(·|y
n, zn, Eδ = 0)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣QUt(·|wt, zt)) (112)
=
1
n
∑
(un,zn,wn,yn)∈Aδ
Pσ(u
n, zn, wn, yn|Eδ = 0)× log2
1∏n
t=1Q(ut|wt, zt)
−
1
n
n∑
t=1
H(Ut|Y
n, Zn, Eδ = 0)
(113)
≤H(U |W,Z)−
1
n
H(Un|W n, Y n, Zn, Eδ = 0) + δ (114)
≤H(U |W,Z)−
1
n
H(Un|W n, Zn, Eδ = 0) + δ (115)
=H(U |W,Z)−
1
n
H(Un|Eδ = 0) +
1
n
I(Un;W n|Eδ = 0)
+
1
n
H(Zn|W n, Eδ = 0)−
1
n
H(Zn|Un,W n, Eδ = 0) + δ. (116)
Equation (112)-(113) come from the hypothesis Eδ = 0 of typical sequences (un, zn, wn, yn) ∈ Aδ and
the definition of the conditional K-L divergence [72, pp. 24].
Equation (114) comes from property of typical sequences [69, pp. 26] and the conditioning that reduces
entropy.
Equation (115) comes from the Markov chain Zn−
−Un−
−W n−
−Y n induced by the channel and the
strategy σ, that implies H(Un|W n, Zn, Eδ = 0) = H(Un|W n, Y n, Zn, Eδ = 0).
Equation (116) is a reformulation of (115).
We denote by Aδ(zn|wn) the set of sequences zn ∈ Zn that are jointly typical with wn, i.e. ||QnWZ −
QWZ ||1 < δ.
1
n
H(Un|Eδ = 0) ≥H(U)−
1
n
− log2 |U| · Pσ
(
Eδ = 1
)
, (117)
1
n
I(Un;W n|Eδ = 0) ≤R + RL = I(U ;W ) + η, (118)
1
n
H(Zn|W n, Eδ = 0) ≤
1
n
log2 |Aδ(z
n|wn)| ≤ H(Z|W ) + δ, (119)
1
n
H(Zn|Un,W n, Eδ = 0) ≥
1
n
H(Zn|Un,W n)−
1
n
− log2 |U| · Pσ
(
Eδ = 1
)
(120)
=H(Z|U,W )−
1
n
− log2 |U| · Pσ
(
Eδ = 1
)
. (121)
Equation (117) comes from the i.i.d. source and Fano’s inequality.
Equation (118) comes from the cardinality of codebook given by (104). This argument is also used in
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[73, Eq. (23)].
Equation (119) comes from the cardinality of Aδ(zn|wn), see also [69, pp. 27].
Equation (120) comes from Fano’s inequality.
Equation (120) comes from H(Zn|Un,W n) = H(Zn|Un) = H(Z|U) = H(Z|U,W ) due to the Markov
chain Zn −
− Un −
−W n of the encoding σ, the i.i.d. property of the source (U,Z), the Markov chain
Z −
−U −
−W of the single-letter characterization QUZW ∈ Q0.
Equations (116)-(120) shows that on average, the posterior beliefs Pσ,Ut(·|y
n, zn, Eδ = 0) induced by
strategy σ is close to the target probability distribution QU (·|w, z).
Eσ
[
1
n
n∑
t=1
D
(
Pσ,Ut(·|Y
n, Zn, Eδ = 0)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣QUt(·|Wt, Zt))
]
≤2δ + η +
2
n
+ 2 log2 |U| · Pσ
(
Eδ = 1
)
:= ǫ. (122)
Then we have:
Pσ(B
c
α,γ,δ) =1−Pσ(Bα,γ,δ)
=Pσ(Eδ = 1)Pσ(B
c
α,γ,δ|Eδ = 1) + Pσ(Eδ = 0)Pσ(B
c
α,γ,δ|Eδ = 0)
≤Pσ(Eδ = 1) + Pσ(B
c
α,γ,δ|Eδ = 0)
≤ε2 + Pσ(B
c
α,γ,δ|Eδ = 0). (123)
Moreover:
Pσ(B
c
α,γ,δ|Eδ = 0)
=
∑
wn,yn,zn
Pσ
(
(wn, yn, zn) ∈ Bcα,γ,δ
∣∣∣Eδ = 0) (124)
=
∑
wn,yn,zn
Pσ
(
(wn, yn, zn) s.t.
|Tα(w
n, yn, zn)|
n
< 1− γ
∣∣∣∣∣Eδ = 0
)
(125)
=Pσ
(
1
n
·
∣∣∣∣{t, s.t. D(Pσ,Ut(·|yn, zn)∣∣∣∣∣∣QUt(·|wt, zt)) ≤ α22 ln 2
}∣∣∣∣ < 1− γ
∣∣∣∣∣Eδ = 0
)
(126)
=Pσ
(
1
n
·
∣∣∣∣{t, s.t. D(Pσ,Ut(·|yn, zn)∣∣∣∣∣∣QUt(·|wt, zt)) > α22 ln 2
}∣∣∣∣ ≥ γ
∣∣∣∣∣Eδ = 0
)
(127)
≤
2 ln 2
α2γ
· Eσ
[
1
n
n∑
t=1
D
(
Pσ,Ut(·|y
n, zn)
∣∣∣∣∣∣QUt(·|wt, zt))] (128)
≤
2 ln 2
α2γ
·
(
η + δ +
2
n
+ 2 log2 |U| · Pσ
(
Eδ = 1
))
. (129)
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Equation (124) to (127) are simple reformulations.
Equation (128) comes from the double use of Markov’s inequality as in [4, Lemma A.21, pp. 42].
Equation (129) comes from (122).
Combining equations (111), (123), (129) and choosing η > 0 small, we obtain the following statement:
∀ε > 0, ∀α > 0, ∀γ > 0, ∃δ¯ > 0, ∀δ < δ¯, ∃n¯ ∈ N⋆, ∀n ≥ n¯,∃σ, s.t. Pσ(B
c
α,γ,δ) ≤ ε. (130)
This concludes the proof of Proposition B.1.
APPENDIX C
CONVERSE PROOF OF THEOREM III.3
We consider an encoding strategy σ of length n ∈ N⋆. We denote by T the uniform random variable
over {1, . . . , n} and let Z−T stand for (Z1, . . . , ZT−1, ZT+1, . . . Zn), where ZT has been removed. We
identify (U,Z) = (UT , ZT ) and we introduce the auxiliary random variable W = (Y n, Z−T , T ) whose
joint probability distribution PUZW is defined by
P(u, z, w) =Pσ
(
uT , zT , y
n, z−T , T
)
=P(T = t) · Pσ
(
uT , zT , y
n, z−T
∣∣T = t)
=
1
n
· Pσ
(
ut, zt, y
n, z−t
)
, ∀(u,w, z, un, zn, yn). (131)
This ensures that the Markov chain W −
−U −
−Z is satisfied. Let us fix a decoding strategy τV n|Y nZn
and define τ˜V |WZ = τ˜V |Y nZ−TTZ = τVT |Y nZn . The encoder’s long-run distortion writes:
dne (σ, τ) =
∑
un,zn,yn
Pσ(u
n, zn, yn)
∑
vn
τ(vn|yn, zn) ·
[
1
n
n∑
t=1
de(ut, zt, vt)
]
(132)
=
n∑
t=1
∑
ut,zt,
z−t,yn
1
n
· Pσ(ut, z
n, yn)
∑
vt
τ(vt|y
n, zn) · de(ut, zt, vt) (133)
=
∑
ut,zt,y
n,
z−t,t
Pσ(ut, zt, y
n, z−t, t)
∑
vt
τ(vt|zt, y
n, z−t, t) · de(ut, zt, vt) (134)
=
∑
u,z,w
P(u, z, w)
∑
v
τ˜(v|w, z) · de(u, z, v). (135)
Equations (132) - (134) are reformulations and re-orderings.
Equation (135) comes from replacing the random variables (Y n, Z−T , T ) by W and (UT , ZT ) by (U,Z),
whose distribution is defined in (131).
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Equations (132) - (135) are also valid for the decoder’s distortion dn
d
(σ, τ) =
∑
u,z,
w,v
P(u, z, w)τ˜ (v|w, z)·
dd(u, z, v). A best-reply strategy τ ∈ BRd(σ) reformulates as:
τ ∈ argminτ ′
V n|Y nZn
∑
un,zn,
xn,yn,vn
Pσ(u
n, zn, xn, yn) · τ ′(vn|yn, zn) ·
[
1
n
n∑
t=1
dd(ut, zt, vt)
]
(136)
⇐⇒τ˜V |WZ ∈ argminτ˜ ′
V |WZ
∑
u,z,w
P(u, z, w) · τ˜ ′(v|w, z) · dd(u, z, v) (137)
⇐⇒τ˜V |WZ ∈ Q2
(
PUZW
)
. (138)
We now prove that the distribution PUZW defined in (131), satisfies the information constraint of the set
Q0.
0 ≤I(Xn;Y n)− I(Un, Zn;Y n) (139)
≤
n∑
t=1
H(Yt)−
n∑
t=1
H(Yt|Xt)− I(U
n;Y n|Zn) (140)
≤n ·max
PX
I(X;Y )−
n∑
t=1
I(Ut;Y
n|Zn, U t−1) (141)
=n ·max
PX
I(X;Y )−
n∑
t=1
I(Ut;Y
n, Z−t, U t−1|Zt) (142)
≤n ·max
PX
I(X;Y )−
n∑
t=1
I(Ut;Y
n, Z−t|Zt) (143)
=n ·max
PX
I(X;Y )− n · I(UT ;Y
n, Z−T |ZT , T ) (144)
=n ·max
PX
I(X;Y )− n · I(UT ;Y
n, Z−T , T |ZT ) (145)
=n ·max
PX
I(X;Y )− n · I(U ;W |Z) (146)
=n ·
(
max
PX
I(X;Y )− I(U ;W ) + I(Z;W )
)
. (147)
Equation (139) comes from the Markov chain Y n −
−Xn −
− (Un, Zn).
Equation (140) comes from the memoryless property of the channel and from removing the positive term
I(Un;Zn) ≥ 0.
Equation (141) comes from taking the maximum over PX and the chain rule.
Equation (142) comes from the i.i.d. property of the source (U,Z) which implies I(Ut, Zt;Z−t, U t−1) =
I(Ut;Z
−t, U t−1|Zt) = 0.
Equation (143) comes from removing I(Ut;U t−1|Y n, Z−t, Zt) ≥ 0.
Equation (144) comes from the introduction of the uniform random variable T ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Equation (145) comes from the independence between T and (UT , ZT ), which implies I(UT , ZT ;T ) =
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I(UT ;T |ZT ) = 0.
Equation (146) comes from the identification of (U,Z) = (UT , ZT ) and W = (Y n, Z−T , T ).
Equation (147) comes from the Markov chain property W −
−U −
−Z . This proves that the distribution
Pσ,UZW belongs to the set Q0.
Therefore, for any encoding strategy σ and all n, we have:
max
τ∈BRd(σ)
dne (σ, τ) (148)
= max
τ˜V |WZ∈
Q2(PUZW )
∑
u,z,w
P(u, z, w)
∑
v
τ˜(v|w, z) · de(u, z, v) (149)
= max
τ˜V |WZ∈
Q2(PUZW )
EP(u,z,w)
τ˜V |WZ
[
de(U,Z, V )
]
(150)
≥ inf
QUZW∈Q0
max
QV |WZ∈
Q2(QUZW )
E QUZW
QV |WZ
[
de(U,Z, V )
]
= D⋆e. (151)
The last inequality holds because Pσ,UZW ∈ Q0.
The proof for the cardinality bound |W| = min(|U| + 1, |V||Z|) follows two arguments. The bound
|W| = |U| + 1 comes [71, Corollary 17.1.5, pp. 157], also in [4, Corollary A.2, pp. 26]. The bound
|W| = |V||Z| comes from assuming that the encoder tells to the decoder to select a function from the
side information Z to the symbols V , as discussed in Sec. III-D.
This concludes the proof of (20) in Theorem III.3.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION IV.2
The average distortion Ψe(q) defined in (53) is piece-wise linear, hence the optimal triple of posteriors
may belong to distinct intervals q1 ∈ [0, ν1), q2 ∈ [ν1, ν2), q3 ∈ [ν2, 1]. Since δ0 = δ1 and κ = 0, the
function Ψe(q) is symmetric and constant over the interval [ν1, ν2], as depicted in Fig 7. The optimal
splitting must satisfy (q1, q2, q3) = (q1,
1
2 , 1 − q1), since q2 =
1
2 provides the highest entropy h(q2) =
H(U |Z). Equations (58)-(60) reformulate as
λ1 =
1
2
·
C
H(U |Z)− h(q1)
, (152)
λ2 =1−
C
H(U |Z)− h(q1)
, (153)
λ3 =
1
2
·
C
H(U |Z)− h(q1)
. (154)
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We examine the feasibility conditions, i.e. (λ1, λ2, λ3) ∈ [0, 1]3. We recall that the notation
h−1
(
H(U |Z) − C
)
stands for the unique solution q ∈ [0, 12 ] of the equation h(q) = H(U |Z) − C .
Since H(U |Z) ≥ h(q1) for all q1, we have λ1 ≥ 0, λ2 ≤ 1 and λ3 ≥ 0, moreover
λ1 ≤ 1⇐⇒ h(q1) ≤ H(U |Z)−
1
2
· C ⇐⇒ q1 ≤ h
−1
(
H(U |Z)−
1
2
· C
)
(155)
λ2 ≥ 0⇐⇒ h(q1) ≤ H(U |Z)− C ⇐⇒ q1 ≤ h
−1
(
H(U |Z)− C
)
. (156)
Since the function h−1 is increasing over the interval [0, 1], we have h−1
(
H(U |Z) − 12 · C
)
≤
h−1
(
H(U |Z)− C
)
. This proves the following Lemma.
Lemma 5 The splitting (q1, q2, q3) = (q1,
1
2 , 1− q1) is feasible if and only if
q1 ≤ h
−1
(
H(U |Z)− C
)
. (157)
We assume that (q1, q2, q3) = (q1,
1
2 , 1− q1), we define the encoder’s distortion function by
Φe(q1) =λ1Ψe(q1) + λ2Ψe
(1
2
)
+ λ3Ψe(1− q1) (158)
=
1
2
·
C
H(U |Z)− h(q1)
· q1 +
(
1−
C
H(U |Z)− h(q1)
)
· δ +
1
2
·
C
H(U |Z)− h(q1)
· q1 (159)
=δ −
(δ − q1) · C
H(U |Z)− h(q1)
, (160)
Its derivative is
Φ′e(q1) =
C
(H(U |Z)− h(q1))2
·
(
H(U |Z)− h(q1)− h
′(q1) · (δ − q1)
)
, (161)
where the derivative of the entropy h′(q) writes
h′(q) = log2
1− q
q
− (1− 2 · δ) · log2
1− q ⋆ δ
q ⋆ δ
. (162)
We examine the term k(q) =
(
H(U |Z) − h(q) − h′(q) · (δ − q)
)
of the function Φ′e(q). We have
limq→0 k(q) = −∞ since limq→0 h′(q) = +∞ and k(δ) = H(U |Z) − h(δ) = Hb(δ ⋆ δ) − Hb(δ) > 0
since δ < 12 . The derivative k
′(q) = −h′′(q) · (δ − q) > 0 is strictly positive because δ > q and the
entropy is strictly concave h′′(q) < 0. Hence the equation k(q) = 0 has a unique solution q⋆ ∈ (0, δ[.
The derivative Φ′e(q) is non-positive on the interval q ∈ (0, q
⋆] and non-negative on the interval
q ∈ [q⋆, δ), hence the distortion Φe(q) reaches its minimum in q⋆.
1) If q⋆ ≤ h−1
(
H(U |Z)−C
)
, then the optimal splitting is
q1 = q
⋆ q2 =
1
2 q3 = 1− q
⋆
λ1 =
1
2 ·
C
H(U |Z)−h(q⋆) λ2 = 1−
C
H(U |Z)−h(q⋆) λ3 =
1
2 ·
C
H(U |Z)−h(q⋆)
September 18, 2020 DRAFT
35
corresponding to the strategies
α1 = (1− q
⋆) · C
H(U |Z)−h(q⋆) α2 = 1−
C
H(U |Z)−h(q⋆) α3 = q
⋆ · C
H(U |Z)−h(q⋆)
β1 = q
⋆ · C
H(U |Z)−h(q⋆) β2 = 1−
C
H(U |Z)−h(q⋆) β3 = (1− q
⋆) · C
H(U |Z)−h(q⋆)
and the optimal distortion is
D⋆e =δ −C ·
δ − q⋆
H(U |Z)− h(q⋆)
. (163)
2) If q⋆ > h−1
(
H(U |Z)−C
)
, then the optimal splitting is
q1 = h
−1
(
H(U |Z)− C
)
q2 =
1
2 q3 = 1− h
−1
(
H(U |Z)− C
)
λ1 =
1
2 λ2 = 0 λ3 =
1
2
corresponding to the strategies
α1 = 1− h
−1
(
H(U |Z)− C
)
α2 = 0 α3 = h
−1
(
H(U |Z)− C
)
β1 = h
−1
(
H(U |Z)− C
)
β2 = 0 β3 = 1− h
−1
(
H(U |Z)− C
)
and the optimal distortion is
D⋆e =h
−1
(
H(U |Z)− C
)
. (164)
3) If C > H(U |Z), then the extreme splitting (q1, q3) = (0, 1) is feasible and D⋆e = 0.
This concludes the proof of Proposition IV.2.
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